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Secure and Extensible Platform Architecture for Enterprise Network Orchestration

Abstract

There is a growing demand to have enterprise network orchestration platforms to be extensible in the sense that they can be able to integrate different services, automation tools, external systems and independently developed capabilities without affecting the architectural stability and operational control. The paper presents a safe and scalable platform architecture that puts emphasis on controlled extension plane which isolates orchestration invariants of the core and optional capabilities. Typical used architecture is versioned capability contracts, service catalog, event-based subscriptions, isolated execution environment, delegated authorization, resource quotas, conformance testing and governance of lifecycle. It can engage in the orchestration ecosystem by having explicit ownership, compatibility requirements, data classes, resource budgets and failure-handling policies. Security is integrated during the registration, discovery, execution, upgrade, monitoring and retirement of extensions as opposed to being considered only as a runtime issue. The framework also provides compatibility management, policy enforcement, observability and faulty or nonconforming extensions recovery mechanisms. Framework assessment includes effort on integration, preservation of compatibility, isolation of execution, enforcement of authorization, observability of operations, and effectiveness of recovery. Work offered architecture not only offers independent teams and external systems to develop capabilities, but also offers standardized interfaces and governance boundaries and minimizes dependency on internal data stores and release processes. The resulting model is able to maintain platform development particularly in regards to orchestration core that is maintained, audited, and governed by policy and remains stable platforms

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